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Abstract
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can
be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A
(single-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. A
well-known solution is the nucleolus.
A cooperative game with a permission structure describes a situation in which players
in a cooperative TU-game are hierarchically ordered in the sense that there are players that
need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate. The corresponding
restricted game takes account of the limited cooperation possibilities by assigning to every
coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset.
In this paper we consider the class of non-negative additive games with an acyclic
permission structure. This class generalizes the so-called peer group games being non-
negative additive games on a permission tree. We provide a polynomial time algorithm for
computing the nucleolus of every restricted game corresponding to some disjunctive non-
negative additive game with an acyclic permission structure. We discuss an application
to market situations where sellers can sell objects to buyers through a directed network of
intermediaries.
Keywords: TU-game, additive game, acyclic permission structure, disjunctive approach,
peer group game, nucleolus, algorithm, complexity.
AMS subject classification: 91A12, 5C20
JEL code: C71
1 Introduction
A cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, is a finite set of players
and for any subset (coalition) of players a worth representing the total payoff that the
coalition can obtain by cooperating. A payoff vector is a vector which gives a payoff to
each of the players, i.e., each component corresponds to precisely one of the players. A
payoff vector is efficient if the sum of the payoffs is equal to the worth of the grand coalition
consisting of all players. A set-valued solution for TU-games assigns a set of payoff vectors
(possibly empty) to every TU-game. A single-valued solution assigns precisely one payoff
vector to every TU-game. A solution is said to be efficient if for every game any payoff
vector assigned by the solution is efficient. The most well-known efficient set-valued solution
is the Core (Gillies, 1953). The two most well-known efficient single-valued solutions are
the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953) and the nucleolus (Schmeidler, 1969).
In this paper we assume that the players in a TU-game are part of some hierarchical
structure that is represented by a directed graph such that some players need permission
from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a coalition. In the literature
two approaches to these games with a permission structure can be found. In the conjunctive
approach, as considered in Gilles, Owen and van den Brink (1992) and van den Brink and
Gilles (1996), it is assumed that each player needs permission from all its predecessors
in the directed graph before it is allowed to cooperate. Alternatively, in the disjunctive
approach as developed in Gilles and Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997), a player
needs permission to cooperate of at least one of its direct predecessors (if it has any). So,
according to the conjunctive approach a coalition is feasible if and only if for any player
in the coalition, all its predecessors are also in the coalition, whereas according to the
disjunctive approach a coalition is feasible if and only if for any player in the coalition at
least one of its predecessors (if it has any) is also in the coalition. Following an approach
similar to that of Myerson (1977) for games with limited communication (graph) structure,
in both the conjunctive and disjunctive approach to games with a permission structure a
restricted game is derived. In games with a permission structure the restricted game assigns
to every coalition the worth of its largest feasible subset. Applying well-known solutions
as the Shapley value, Core or nucleolus to such restricted games yields solutions for games
with a permission structure.
A special subclass of games with a permission structure arises from peer group
situations, as introduced in Brânzei, Fragnelli and Tijs (2002). A peer group situation
is a triple consisting of a set of players, a hierarchical structure represented by a rooted
(directed) tree, and for each player a non-negative real number representing its potential
individual (economic) contribution to the society of all players. This yields an associated
TU-game being the additive game in which the worth of any coalition is equal to the sum
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of the individual potentials of its members. In a rooted directed tree there is one top node
(not having a predecessor), while any other node has precisely one predecessor. So, in
case the hierarchical structure on the player set is a rooted directed tree, the conjunctive
approach and the disjunctive approach as described above, coincide. The restricted game
of the associated TU-game with respect to such a permission structure is called a peer
group game. These peer group games have many interesting applications, see Brânzei et
al. (2002). Clearly, in a peer group game the worth of a coalition is the sum of the
individual potentials of the members of the largest feasible subset of the coalition. Since
the top player is always in this set when it belongs to the coalition, and the largest feasible
set is the empty set for any coalition not containing the unique top player, it follows that
the top player is a veto player, i.e., any coalition not containing the top player has zero
worth in the restricted game. In this paper we generalize peer group games by considering
non-negative additive games on acyclic permission structures (which are not necessarily
trees). Consequently, these games need not to contain a veto player1.
In Arin and Feltkamp (1997) an exponential time algorithm has been given for
veto-rich games, i.e., games that have at least one veto player. For the special case of
a peer group game a polynomial time algorithm is given in Brânzei, Solymosi and Tijs
(2005) and for a class of games satisfying so-called weak digraph monotonicity and weak
digraph concavity conditions with respect to acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission
structures, a polynomial time algorithm is given in van den Brink, Katsev and van der
Laan (2008). This latter class of games is more general than the class of peer group games,
but the acyclic permission structure is still required to be quasi-strongly connected. In this
paper we provide a polynomial time algorithm to compute the nucleolus of the restricted
game induced by situations in which the associated TU-game is still additive, but in which
we allow for any acyclic permission structure, so allowing more than one top player. This
considerably widens the applications, for example we can consider situations where sellers
can sell objects to buyers through a directed network of intermediaries. Wherease quasi-
strongly connected networks only can be used for situations with one seller, weakening
this by only requiring that the network is acyclic, we can also study such situations with
more than one seller. The algorithm presented in this paper computes the nucleolus in
polynomial time through a number of iterations. In each iteration a subgame with an
acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure is considered and the algorithm
developed in van den Brink et al. (2008) is used to compute the nucleolus for this subgame.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is a preliminary section containing co-
operative TU-games (with special attention for the nucleolus), directed graphs and games
1A further generalization are the so-called interior operator games where the game is non-negative and
additive and the set of feasible coalitions is an antimatroid, see Bilbao et al. (2005, 2008).
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with a permission structure. In Section 3 we provide the algorithm to find the nucleolus
for disjunctive non-negative additive games with an acyclic permission structure. Section 4
shows that the algorithm indeed computes the nucleolus for this class of games. In Section
5 we discuss some properties of the algorithm, while Section 6 discusses its complexity,
showing that it indeed finds the nucleolus in polynomial time. Section 7 illustrates the
algorithm with an example of a market situation where sellers can sell objects to buyers
through a directed network of intermediaries. Finally, there is an appendix with the al-
gorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) that is used in each iteration of the algorithm to
compute the nucleolus of a non-negative additive subgame with an acyclic, quasi-strongly
connected permission structure.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 TU-games
A situation in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperating can be
described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game, being a pair
(N, v), where N ⊂ IN is a finite set of n players and v : 2N → R is a characteristic function
on N such that v(∅) = 0. For any coalition S ⊆ N , v(S) is the worth of coalition S, i.e.,
the members of coalition S can obtain a total payoff of v(S) by agreeing to cooperate.
For simplicity, for a single player i we denote its worth v({i}) by v(i). When there is no
confusion about the player set N we often denote the game (N, v) just by its characteristic
function v. We denote the collection of all characteristic functions on N by GN and n = |N |
denotes the cardinality of N . Further, for game v ∈ GN and coalition K ⊆ N we define
the subgame vK ∈ GK by vK(S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ K.
A payoff vector for a game is a vector x ∈ IRn assigning a payoff xi to every i ∈ N .
In the sequel, for S ⊆ N we denote x(S) =
∑
i∈S xi. A payoff vector is efficient if
x(N) = v(N) and it is individually rational if xi ≥ v(i) for every i ∈ N . The imputation
set I(N, v) of game (N, v) is given by
I(N, v) = {x ∈ Rn|x(N) = v(N) and xi ≥ v(i) for every i ∈ N},
i.e., I(N, v) is the set of all efficient and individually rational payoff vectors. A (set-valued)
solution F on GN assigns a set F (N, v) ⊂ Rn of payoff vectors to every characteristic
function v ∈ GN . The most well-known set-valued solution is the Core assigning to every
v ∈ GN the set
C(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v)|x(S) ≥ v(S) for all S ⊂ N},
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i.e., it is the set of all imputations that are stable in the sense that no coalition can do
better by separating from the grand coalition. The Core of (N, v) is non-empty if and only
if the game is balanced, see e.g. Bondareva (1962) or Shapley (1967).
Another (set-valued) solution is the Kernel assigning to every v ∈ GN the set
K(N, v) = {x ∈ I(N, v)| [sij(x) = sji(x)] or [sij(x) > sji(x) and xj = v(j)] for all i, j ∈ N},
i.e., the set of all imputations such that for each pair of players i and j the complaint
sij(x) = max{v(S)− x(S) | i ∈ S, j ∈ S} of i against j is at least equal to the complaint
of j against i, with equality whenever j gets more than its individual worth v(j).
A solution F is said to be single-valued if it assigns to any v ∈ GN a unique payoff
vector. One of the two most well-known single-valued solutions is the nucleolus (Schmeidler,
1969).2 To define the nucleolus, consider a given characteristic function v ∈ GN , and let
x ∈ IRn be a payoff vector. Then the excess e(S, x) of a coalition S ⊆ N is defined by
e(S, x) = v(S)− x(S).
Further, let E(x) be the (2n − 2)-component vector that is composed of the excesses of
all coalitions S ⊂ N, S = ∅, in a non-increasing order, so E1(x) ≥ E2(x) ≥ . . . ≥
E2n−2(x). Then the nucleolus Nuc(N, v) of the game (N, v) is the unique imputation
which lexicographically minimizes the vector-valued function E(·) over the imputation set.
Formally,
Nuc(N, v) = x ∈ I(N, v) such that E(x) L E(y) for all y ∈ I(N, v),
where L denotes the lexicographic order of vectors. It is well-known that Nuc(N, v) ∈
K(N, v) and that Nuc(N, v) ∈ C(N, v) when C(N, v) = ∅. So, when the game has a
nonempty Core, then the nucleolus is in the intersection of the Kernel and the Core.
In a game (N, v), a coalition S is called inessential if it has a partition {S1, . . . , Sr}
with r ≥ 2, such that v(S) ≤
∑r
j=1 v(Sj). Coalitions which are not inessential are called
essential. Notice that single player coalitions are always essential. It is straightforward to
observe that for an inessential coalition S it holds that
e(S, x) ≤
r∑
j=1
e(Sj, x), for all x ∈ IR
n.
Therefore the Core, and thus also the nucleolus, is independent of inessential coalitions, as
was noticed by Huberman (1980). In fact, in any n player game there are at most (2n− 2)
coalitions which actually determine the nucleolus, see Brune (1983) and Reijnierse and
Potters (1998). However, as noticed by Brânzei et al. (2005), identifying these coalitions
is no less laborious as computing the nucleolus itself.
2The other one is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953).
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2.2 Directed graphs
A directed graph or digraph is a pair (N,D) where N = {1, ..., n} is a finite set of nodes
(representing the players) and D ⊆ N × N is a binary relation on N . Given (N,D) and
S ⊆ N , the graph (S,D(S)) is the subgraph on S given by D(S) = {(i, j) ∈ D|i, j ∈ S}.
In the sequel we simply refer to D for a digraph (N,D) and to D(S) for the subgraph
(S,D(S)). For i ∈ N the nodes in SD(i) := {j ∈ N | (i, j) ∈ D} are called the successors
of i, and the nodes in PD(i) := {j ∈ N | (j, i) ∈ D} are called the predecessors of i. For
a set T ⊆ N , let SD(T ) = ∪i∈T SD(i) denote the union of the sets of successors of the
players in T , respectively PD(T ) = ∪i∈T PD(i) the set of all predecessors the players in T .
Further, TD = {i ∈ N | PD(i) = ∅} denotes the set of top nodes in D, being the set of
nodes not having a predecessor.
For given D on N , a path between i and j in N is a sequence of distinct nodes
(i1, . . . , im) such that i1 = i, im = j, and {(ik, ik+1), (ik+1, ik)}∩D = ∅ for k = 1, . . . ,m−1.
A set of nodes T ⊆ N is connected in digraph D if there is a path between any two nodes in
T that only uses arcs between nodes in T , i.e., if for every i, j ∈ T there is a path (i1, . . . , im)
between i and j such that {i1, . . . , im} ⊆ T . A component in D is a maximally connected
set T of nodes, i.e., T is connected and T ∪ {i} is not connected for every i ∈ N \ T . A
path (i1, . . . , im) from i1 to im is a directed path in D if (ik, ik+1) ∈ D for k = 1, . . . ,m− 1.
For a set of nodes T ⊂ N and i ∈ T , we call a directed path (i1, . . . , im) a path from T to
i if i1 ∈ T and im = i. For every (directed) path p = (i1, . . . im) we denote the set of nodes
on that path by H(p) = {i1, . . . , im}. A directed path (i1, . . . , im), m ≥ 1, in D is a cycle
in D if (im, i1) ∈ D. We call digraph D acyclic if it does not contain any cycle. Note that
acyclicity of a digraph D implies that D is irreflexive, i.e., (i, i) ∈ D for all i ∈ N . The
collection of all acyclic digraphs on N is denoted by DN . For any D ∈ DN the set of top
nodes TD is not empty and for every i ∈ TD there is a path from TD to i. The collection
of all paths p from TD to i ∈ TD is denoted by Pi.
A digraph is called quasi-strongly connected if there exists a node i0 ∈ N , such
that for every j = i0 there is a directed path from i0 to j. When D is, moreover, acyclic
then TD = {i0}, i.e., i0 is the unique top node in N . A quasi-strongly connected digraph
D ∈ DN is a rooted directed tree with the root being the top node i0 if there is precisely
one path from top-node i0 to every other node.
By ŜD(i) we denote the set of nodes that can be reached from i by a directed path,
i.e., j ∈ ŜD(i) if and only if there exists a sequence of players (h1, . . . , ht) such that h1 = i,
hk+1 ∈ SD(hk) for all 1 ≤ k ≤ t − 1, and ht = j.3 The players in ŜD(i) are called the
subordinates of i, and the players in P̂D(i) := {j ∈ N | i ∈ ŜD(j)} are called the superiors
of i. For two different nodes i and j, we say that node j ∈ N is a complete subordinate
3So, ŜD(i) is the set of successors of i in the transitive closure of D.
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of node i ∈ N in D if every path from TD to j contains node i. The set of complete
subordinates of node i is denoted by SD(i), i.e.,
SD(i) = {j ∈ N \ {i} | i ∈ H(p) for every p ∈ Pj}.
Also we call the players in the set
PD(i) = {j ∈ N \ {i} | j ∈ H(p) for every p ∈ Pi}
the complete superiors of i in D.
2.3 Restricted games
In this paper we assume that the players in a TU-game are part of a hierarchical structure
that is represented by a directed graph, refered to as a permission structure, such that some
players need permission from other players before they are allowed to cooperate within a
coalition. A triple (N, v,D) with (N, v) a TU-game and (N,D) a digraph with the player
set N as the set of nodes is called a game with a permission structure. In the sequel we
assume that D ∈ DN .
Assumption 2.1 (N,D) is acyclic.
As noticed in the introduction we can distinguish between the conjunctive and disjunctive
approach. In this paper we consider the disjunctive approach as developed in Gilles and
Owen (1994) and van den Brink (1997), where a player needs permission to cooperate of
at least one of its direct predecessors (if it has any). Therefore a coalition is feasible if and
only if for any player in the coalition at least one of its predecessors (if it has any) is also in
the coalition. So, for permission structure (N,D), the set of disjunctive feasible coalitions
is given by
ΦD = {S ⊆ N |PD(i) ∩ S = ∅ for all i ∈ S \ TD } .
For any S ⊆ N , let σ(S) = ∪{T ∈ ΦD | T ⊆ S} be the largest disjunctive feasible subset
of S in D.4 By Assumption 2.1 we have that for every S ⊆ N with σ(S) = ∅, the subgraph
(σ(S),D(σ(S)) is acyclic.
Given the triple (N, v,D) with v ∈ GN and D ∈ DN , under the disjunctive permis-
sion structure the induced restricted game r : 2N → R is given by
r(S) = v(σ(S)) for all S ⊆ N. (2.1)
4Every coalition having a unique largest feasible subset follows from ΦD being closed under union.
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If |TD| = 1 then D is quasi-strongly connected and for the unique top player i0 it holds
that r(S) = 0 when i0 ∈ S, i.e., the restricted game is a veto-rich game with top-player
i0 as veto player.
5 If D is a rooted directed tree, then |PD(i)| = 1 for all i = i0 and the
conjunctive and disjunctive approach coincide. In this case the triple (N, v,D) is a peer
group situation when the game (N, v) is a non-negative additive game (see Brânzei et al.
(2002)), i.e., there exist non-negative real numbers ai, i ∈ N , such that
v(S) =
∑
i∈S
ai, S ⊆ N.
Then the restricted game (N, r) as defined in (2.1) is a so-called peer group game and is
given by
r(S) = v(σ(S)) =
∑
{i∈S|P̂D(i)⊆S}
ai.
A peer group game (N, r) is a monotone veto-rich game and has a non-empty Core. In
particular the payoff vector x ∈ IRn+ given by xi0 = v(N) and xi = 0, i = i0, belongs
to the Core. On the other hand it holds that r(S) ≤
∑
i∈S ai and thus also the payoff
vector x ∈ IRn+ given by xi = ai for all i ∈ N belongs to the Core. As noticed in Brânzei
et al. (2002), this class of games with permission structure contains several interesting
applications. Also the two games v and its restriction r are games as considered in Ni
and Wang (2007) to study polluted river games. In particular, their LR polluted river is a
non-negative additive game, and their DR polluted river game is the restriction R of this
game on the permission structure that represents the linear ordering of the players along
the river from upstream to downstream.
3 A polynomial time algorithm for the nucleolus based
on quasi-strongly connectedness
In the remaining of this paper we consider a non-negative additive game with acyclic
permission structure (N, v,D). Since σ(S) ⊆ S for any S ⊆ N , also in this case we have
that r(S) = v(σ(S)) ≤
∑
i∈S ai. Therefore the payoff vector x ∈ IR
n
+ given by xi = ai for
all i ∈ N is in the Core and thus the Core is nonempty and contains the nucleolus.
We first show that for any non-negative additive game with acyclic permission
structure (N, v,D), there exists a subset K ⊆ N with the properties that (i) the sub-
graph (K,D(K)) is an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure and (ii)
5A game (N, v) is a veto-rich game if it contains a veto player being a player i such that v(S) = 0 when
i ∈ S.
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∑
j∈K xj =
∑
j∈K aj for any payoff vector x ∈ IR
n in the Core of the restricted game
(N, r), so also for the nucleolus. These properties play an important role in an algorithm
to compute the nucleolus of the restricted game obtained from a non-negative additive
game with acyclic permission structure (N, v,D). In fact the nucleolus is obtained by
computing the nucleolus of a sequence of smaller non-negative additive games with quasi-
strongly connected permission structures. By definition the properties hold for K = N
when the graph has only one top player. So, in the sequel of this section we only consider
the case that |TD| ≥ 2. The first lemma is obvious and stated without proof.
Lemma 3.1 For every acyclic permission structure (N,D) it holds: j is a (complete)
superior of i if and only if i is a complete subordinate of j.
For a top player t ∈ TD, let the set U t be defined by SD(t) ∪ {t}, i.e., U t contains
top player t together with all its complete subordinates. Observe that TD \U
t = ∅, because
|TD| ≥ 2 and (TD \ {t}) ∩ U
t = ∅. Further, for i ∈ SD(t), define
Ui = ∪ {H(p) | p is a directed path from t to i},
i.e., the set Ui ⊂ N is the union of all players on all directed paths from top player t to its
complete subordinate i. Then we have the next lemma.
Lemma 3.2 Let (N,D) be an acyclic permission structure, t ∈ TD a top player, and
i ∈ SD(t) a complete subordinate of t. Then Ui ⊆ U t.
Proof. By definition we have that t ∈ U t. Since t is a complete superior of i, it follows
that t is a complete superior of any h ∈ Ui \ {t}. Suppose not. Then for some h ∈ Ui \ {t},
there is a path from a top player t′ = t to h, and so also a path from t′ to i, contradicting
that t is a complete superior of i. By Lemma 3.1 we have that any h in Ui is a complete
subordinate of t, and thus h ∈ U t. 
Since Ui ⊆ U t for all i ∈ U t = SD(t) ∪ {t} (see Lemma 3.2) it follows that
U t =
{
{t} if SD(t) = ∅,
∪{i∈SD(t)} Ui otherwise.
So, U t is the union of all sets Ui of the complete subordinates of top player t when t has
at least one complete subordinate, and U t = {t} otherwise.
The next proposition shows the existence of a subset K ⊆ N such that the subgraph
(K,D(K)) is an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure.
Proposition 3.3 Let (N,D) be an acyclic permission structure. Then for every t ∈ TD
it holds that the subgraph (U t, D(U t)) is an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission
structure with t its unique top node.
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Proof. First, when SD(t) = ∅, then U
t = {t} and the statement is true. Otherwise, let
i be a complete subordinate of t. Obviously t is the unique top-player in the subgraph
(Ui, D(Ui)). Further, the subgraph (Ui, D(Ui)) is acyclic and quasi-strongly connected.
Acyclicity follows from the acyclicity of D and the fact that D(Ui) ⊆ D. Quasi-strongly
connectedness follows from acyclicity of D and the fact that Ui is the union of all directed
paths from t to i. Then the result follows because U t = ∪{i∈SD(t)} Ui. 
The next lemma states that when N is partitioned in two disjunctive feasible sets,
for both sets it holds that the total payoff of its players in every core payoff vector of the
restricted game is equal to their own value.
Lemma 3.4 Let A,B ∈ ΦD be two disjunctive feasible coalitions in a non-negative additive
game with acyclic permission structure (N, v,D) such that A ∩ B = ∅ and A ∪ B = N .
Then x(A) =
∑
i∈A ai and x(B) =
∑
i∈B ai for every core element x ∈ C(N, r).
Proof. By definition of the restricted game (N, r) and feasibility of A we have that
r(A) = v(σ(A)) = v(A) =
∑
i∈A ai and r(B) = v(σ(B)) = v(B) =
∑
i∈B ai. Now,
let x ∈ C(N, r). Then x(A) ≥ r(A) and x(B) ≥ r(B). Form the second inequality we
obtain that that x(A) = r(N) − x(B) ≤
∑
i∈N ai −
∑
i∈B ai =
∑
i∈A ai = r(A). Hence
x(A) = r(A) =
∑
i∈A ai. Analogous x(B) = r(B) =
∑
i∈B ai. 
We now state the final result of this section.
Proposition 3.5 Let (N,D) be an acyclic permission structure and t ∈ TD. Then x(U
t) =∑
i∈Ut ai and x(N \ U
t) =
∑
i∈N\Ut ai for every core element x ∈ C(N, r).
Proof. By definition we have that U t is disjunctive feasible. To show that also N \ U t is
disjunctive feasible, consider a player i ∈ N \ U t. Since i = t and i is also not a complete
subordinate of t, there is a path from TD \{t} to i. Hence N \U t is disjunctive feasible. So,
both U t and N \ U t are disjunctive feasible and thus the proposition follows by applying
Lemma 3.4 to A = U t and B = N \ U t. 
From the Propositions 3.3 and 3.5 it follows that for any t ∈ TD it holds that
U t ⊂ N satisfies both properties that (U t, D(U t)) is an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected
permission structure and
∑
j∈Ut xj = r(U
t) =
∑
j∈Ut aj for every x ∈ C(N, r), so also for
the nucleolus. This property is now used to compute the nucleolus of the restricted game
(N, r) obtained from a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (that
is not necessarily quasi-strongly connected) in a finite number of steps. At each step we
compute the nucleolus of a smaller additive game with an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected
permission structure by applying the O(n4) algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) for
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such games. This algorithm is an adaptation of the algorithm of Arin and Feltkamp (1997),
which computes the nucleolus of veto-rich games in exponential time. Note that permission
games with an acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure are indeed veto-rich
games, which is not true for the ive the algorithm, we introduce one more notation. Let
(N,D) be an acyclic permission structure, t ∈ TD be one of the top players andK = N \U t.
Then the set DK ∈ DK on the set of players K is given by
(i, j) ∈ DK if and only if (i, j) ∈ D and PD(j) ∩ U
t = ∅. (3.2)
So, for two players i, j ∈ K, (i, j) is an arc in DK if and only if (i, j) is an arc in D and j
does not have a predecessor in U t. Stated differently, DK contains all arcs in D(K), except
the arcs (i, j) such that j is a successor of top player t or of one of its complete subordinates.
Finally, we assume that the players are enumerated (labeled) by the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n in
such a way that for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that i < j if (i, j) ∈ D. From the theory
on acyclic directed graphs it is well-known that such a enumeration exists. Observe that
this assumption implies that node 1 ∈ TD.
Algorithm
Step 1 Set k = 1, N1 = N , D1 = D and t1 = 1. Goto Step 2.
Step 2 Consider the non-negative additive game with acyclic, quasi-strongly connected
permission structure (U tk , vk, Dk(U
tk)) with
vk(U) = v(U) for all U ⊆ U
tk . (3.3)
Let rk be the restricted game of (U
tk , vk, Dk(U
tk)). Goto Step 3.
Step 3 Apply the (polynomial time) algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) (see
the appendix) to find the nucleolus of the restricted game (U tk , rk). Assign yi =
Nuci(U
tk , rk) to every i ∈ U tk . Goto Step 4.
Step 4 If U tk = Nk then Stop. Otherwise, goto Step 5.
Step 5 Define Nk+1 = Nk \ U tk and Dk+1 ∈ DNk+1 by Dk+1 = D
Nk+1
k (i.e., Dk+1 = D
K
as defined in formula (3.2) with D = Dk and K = Nk \ U tk). Define tk+1 ∈ TDk+1
as the top player in Dk+1 with the lowest label (tk+1 ≤ h for every h ∈ TDk+1).
Consider the set U tk+1 consisting of tk+1 and all its complete subordinates in the
graph (Nk+1, Dk+1). Set k = k + 1 and return to step 2.
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4 The algorithm works
In this section we prove that the algorithm indeed finds the nucleolus of the original non-
negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v,D). As a first observation,
according to Proposition 3.5 it must hold that
∑
i∈U1 Nuci(N, r) =
∑
i∈U1 ai, so the
total payoff
∑
i∈U1 ai assigned in the first iteration of the algorithm to the players in U
1
is indeed equal to the total payoff that the players in U1 attain at the Nuc(N, r). Of
course, we still have to prove that the individual payoffs assigned at the first iteration are
the individual payoffs for the players in U1 in Nuc(N, r), and subsequently for the payoffs
assigned at any next iteration. This will be proved by using the Davis-Maschler reduced
game property. For a game (N, v), let T ⊂ N be a nonempty coalition and x ∈ IRn
a payoff vector. Then the Davis-Maschler reduced game on T at x is the game (T, vxT )
given by vxT (T ) = v(N) − x(N \ T ) and v
x
T (S) = maxQ⊆N\T (v(S ∪ Q) − x(Q)), S ⊂ T ,
S = T . Observe that in the definition of the reduced game only the values xj of the players
j ∈ N \ T appear.
Property 4.1 Davis-Maschler reduced game property
For a game (N, v), let x be the Nucleolus of (N, v). Then for any T ⊂ N it holds that
Nuci(N, v) = Nuci(T, v
x
T ), for all i ∈ T.
In the sequel we will denote the characteristic function of the Davis-Maschler reduced
game with respect to the nucleolus x = Nuc(N, v) and coalition T ⊂ N just by v′, if there
is no confusion6. Recall that for game v ∈ GN and coalition T ⊂ N , the subgame vT ∈ GT
is given by vT (S) = v(S) for all S ⊆ T . We now have the following proposition with respect
to U t for some t ∈ TD. For notational simplicity, in the following we denote U t = K.
Proposition 4.2 For a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v,D)
with |TD| ≥ 2, let t ∈ TD be a top player and K = U t. Then the Davis-Maschler reduced
game (K, r′) of the restricted game (N, r) with respect to the nucleolus x ∈ IRn and the set
K, coincides with the subgame (K, rK) of (N, r).
Proof. First, observe that K is feasible and thus rK(K) =
∑
i∈K ai. On the other
hand r′(K) = r(N) − x(N \ K) =
∑
i∈N ai −
∑
i∈N\K ai =
∑
i∈K ai, where the first
equality is by definition of the reduced game and the second equality by Proposition 3.5.
So, rK(K) = r
′(K) =
∑
i∈K ai.
6In general, the Davis-Maschler reduced game property is stated for an arbitrary solution. Since we
apply it here to compute the nucleolus, we only state it in terms of this particular solution.
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Next, consider set U ⊂ K. By definition of the Davis-Maschler reduced game we
have
r′(U) = max
S⊆N\K
(r(U ∪ S)− x(S)). (4.4)
We first show that r′(U) = r′(σ(U)). Therefore it is sufficient to show that for any S ⊆
N \ K it holds that σ(U ∪ S) = σ(σ(U) ∪ S), because for any S ⊆ N \ K the value of
r(U ∪ S) in equation (4.4) is equal to the worth of σ(U ∪ S) in game v. Since σ(U) ⊆ U ,
it is evident that σ(σ(U) ∪ S) ⊆ σ(U ∪ S). Suppose that the inclusion does not hold the
other way around, i.e., there exists some player i ∈ σ(U ∪ S) \ σ(σ(U) ∪ S). For this
player there is a path p from TD to i consisting of players in σ(U ∪S) only, and there does
not exist a path from TD to i consisting of players in σ(σ(U) ∪ S) only. Consider a path
p = (p1, . . . , pm) from TD to i with H(p) ⊆ σ(U ∪ S). We distinguish the following two
cases:
(i). Suppose that p is a directed path from t to i. Since PD(j) ⊂ K for all j ∈ K, there is
a k ∈ {2, . . . ,m} such that {p1, . . . pk} ⊆ U and {pk+1, . . . pm} ⊆ S. Since (p1, . . . pk) is a
directed path in U , we have that {p1, . . . pk} ⊆ σ(U). Thus, H(p) ⊆ σ(U) ∪ S. But then
H(p) ⊆ σ(σ(U) ∪ S) since p is a directed path with p1 = t.
(ii). Suppose that p is a directed path from another top-player t′ = t to i. Since players in
K = U t do not have predecessors in N \K, we have that U∩H(p) = ∅. Thus, H(p) ⊆ σ(S),
and so H(p) ⊆ σ(σ(U) ∪ S).
From (i) and (ii) we conclude that σ(U ∪ S) = σ(σ(U) ∪ S). Hence we have that r′(U) =
r′(σ(U)) and it remains to prove that rK(U) = r
′(U) for any feasible U ⊂ K.
Observe that rK(U) =
∑
i∈U ai when U is feasible. To find r
′(U), we first show that
for finding the maximum in (4.4), it is sufficient to consider only sets S such that U ∪ S is
feasible. If U ∪ S is not feasible, then
r(U ∪ S)− x(S) = r(σ(U ∪ S))− x(S) ≤
r (U ∪ (σ (U ∪ S) \ U))− x (σ (U ∪ S) \ U)− x (S \ (σ (U ∪ S) \ U)) ≤
r (U ∪ (σ (U ∪ S) \ U))− x (σ (U ∪ S) \ U) ,
where the first inequality follows from σ(U ∪ S) \ U ⊆ S and σ(U ∪ S) \ U = S if U ∪ S
is not feasible. So, in case that U ∪ S is not feasible, replacing set S by set σ (U ∪ S) \ U
does not decrease r(U ∪ S)− x(S) in formula (4.4), and thus this expresion is maximized
by a coalition S such that U ∪ S is feasible.
By definition of r′, it now follows that there is some S ⊆ N \K such that U ∪ S is
feasible and
r′(U) = r(U ∪ S)− x(S) =
∑
i∈U∪S
ai − x(S). (4.5)
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Further, since U ∪ S is feasible and U ⊂ K = U t, we have that also K ∪ S is feasible.
So, by the fact that x ∈ C(N, r), we have that x(K ∪ S) = x(K) + x(S) ≥
∑
i∈K∪S ai.
By Proposition 3.5 we have that x(K) = a(K) and thus x(S) ≥
∑
i∈S ai. It follows with
equation (4.5) that
r′(U) =
∑
i∈U
ai +
∑
i∈S
ai − x(S) ≤
∑
i∈U
ai = r(U). (4.6)
From (4.6) and the fact that by definition of the reduced game r′(U) ≥ r(U), we conclude
that
r′(U) = r(U) =
∑
i∈U
ai.
This proves that r′(U) = rK(U) for all U ⊂ K = U t. 
In the first iteration the algorithm finds the nucleolus of (U1, r1). Clearly, the
restricted game (U1, r1) of (U
1, v1,D1) is equal to the subgame (U
1, rU1) of (N, r), which
is equal to the Davis-Maschler reduced game according to the proposition above. So, with
the Davis-Maschler reduced game Property 4.1, the proposition above shows that in the
first iteration the algorithm indeed computes the nucleolus payoffs of the players in U1 in
game (N, r). For t ∈ TD and K = N \ U t, the next proposition shows that the Davis-
Maschler reduced game with respect to the nucleolus and the setK coincides with the game
(K, r2), where r2 is the restricted game of the non-negative game with the reduced acyclic
permission structure (K, vK , D
K) on the set of players K, where (K, vK) is the subgame
of (N, v) on K and DK is as given in formula (3.2) for t = 1, i.e., r2 is the restricted game
used in the second iteration of the algorithm.
Proposition 4.3 For a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v,D)
with |TD| ≥ 2, let t ∈ TD and K = N \ U t. Then the Davis-Maschler reduced game (K, r′)
of the restricted game (N, r) with respect to the nucleolus payoff vector x ∈ IRn and the
set K, coincides with the restricted game (K, r2) of the non-negative additive game with
acyclic permission structure (K, vK, D
K) with DK as defined in formula (3.2).
Proof. By definition, PDK (j) ⊆ K for all j ∈ K, so K is feasible in the reduced graph
(K,DK). Hence r2(K) =
∑
i∈K ai. On the other hand, r
′(K) = r(N) − x(N \ K) =
r(N)− x(U t) =
∑
i∈N ai −
∑
i∈Ut ai =
∑
i∈K ai, where the first equality is by definition
of the reduced game and the second equality by Proposition 3.5. So, r2(K) = r
′(K).
Next, for a set S ⊂ K we consider two cases.
(i). First, suppose that PD(S)∩U t = ∅. For all U ⊆ U t it holds that σ(U∪S) = σ(U)∪σ(S),
since PD(U) ∩ S = ∅. So,
r(S ∪ U)− x(U) = v(σ(U) ∪ σ(S))− x(U) =
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v(σ(U)) + v(σ(S))− x(U) = r(S) + r(U)− x(U) ≤ r(S),
where the second equality follows from v being an additive game and the (last) inequality
follows from the nucleolus being a core element. Hence
r′(S) = max
U⊆Ut
(r(S ∪ U)− x(U)) = r(S).
On the other hand, for all i, j ∈ S we have that (i, j) ∈ DK if (i, j) ∈ D, because no player
j ∈ S has a predecessor in U t. Hence, σ(S) = σK(S), where σK(S) is the largest feasible
subset of S in (K,DK). So,
r′(S) = r(S) = v(σ(S)) = v(σK(S)) = r2(S).
(ii). Secondly we consider the case that PD(S) ∩ U t = ∅. Now, let S ′ ⊆ S be given by
S ′ = σ(U t ∪ S) \ U t. By definition of σ, U t ∪ S ′ is the maximal feasible subset of U t ∪ S
and thus
r(U t ∪ S)− x(U t) = v(U t ∪ S′)− x(U t) =
∑
i∈Ut∪S′
ai −
∑
i∈Ut
ai =
∑
i∈S′
ai,
where the second equality follows by Proposition 3.5. Hence we have that
r′(S) = max
U⊆Ut
(r(S ∪ U)− x(U)) ≥ r(U t ∪ S)− x(U t) =
∑
i∈S′
ai. (4.7)
We now show that this holds with equality. First, recall from the proof of Proposition 4.2
that σ(U ∪ S) = σ(σ(U) ∪ S) for every U ⊂ U t and S ⊂ K. Hence
r(U ∪ S)− x(U) = r(σ(U) ∪ S)− x(U) ≤ r(σ(U) ∪ S)− x(σ(U)),
so that maxU⊆Ut (r(S ∪ U) − x(U)) will be obtained by a feasible set U . Suppose there
exists a feasible U ⊆ U t with r(U ∪ S) − x(U) >
∑
i∈S′ ai. Then, with SU ⊆ S given by
SU = σ(U ∪ S) \ U , it follows in an analogous way as for U = U t above, that σ(U ∪ S) =
U ∪ SU , and thus
r(U ∪ S)− x(U) = v(U ∪ SU)− x(U) =
∑
i∈U∪SU
ai − x(U) =
∑
i∈SU
ai +
∑
i∈U
ai − x(U) ≤
∑
i∈SU
ai ≤
∑
i∈S′
ai, (4.8)
where the first inequality follows because U is feasible and the nucleolus lies in the core,
and the second inequality because U ⊆ U t and thus SU = σ(U ∪ S) \ U ⊆ σ(U t ∪ S) \ U t.
From equations (4.7) and (4.8) it follows that
r′(S) =
∑
i∈S′
ai = v(S
′).
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It remains to prove that also r2(S) = v(S
′). By definition we have that r2(S) =
vK(σK(S)) = v(σK(S)), where σK(S) is the maximal feasible subset of S in graph (K,D
K).
So, it remains to show that σK(S) = S
′.
We first show that σK(S) ⊆ S′ = σ(U t ∪ S) \ U t. Consider i ∈ σK(S). For such a
player i there is a path p from TDK to i which only contains elements of S. We consider
two cases. If p is a path from a top t′ ∈ TD, then i ∈ σ(S) ⊆ S′. For the case that p
is a path from a top t′ in TDK \ TD, then t
′ is a top in (K,DK) but not in (N,D) and
thus PD(t′) ∩ U t = ∅, implying that in (N,D) there is a path p′ from t to t′. Hence,
the path p′′ consisting of the path p′ from t to t′ and the path p from t′ to i is a path in
(N,D) from TD to i. Since H(p
′) \ {t′} ⊆ U t and H(p) ⊆ S, we have that the set of nodes
H(p′′) ⊆ U t ∪ S and thus H(p′′) ⊆ σ(U t ∪ S). So i ∈ σ(U t ∪ S) and we can conclude that
i ∈ σ(U t ∪ S) \ U t = S ′.
Next we show the reverse that S ′ ⊆ σK(S). Let i ∈ S′. Then i ∈ σ(U t ∪ S) and
thus there is path p from TD to i that consists of elements of U
t ∪ S. Again there are two
cases. If H(p) ⊆ S, then i ∈ σ(S) ⊆ σK(S). Otherwise, p consists of two subpaths p′ in
U t and p′′ in S that are connected to each other by a link from the last node of p′ to the
first node of p′′. Let j be that last node of path p′′ that has a predecessor in U t. Then, by
construction, j is a top-node in game (K,DK) and thus the part of p′′ from j to i is a path
in (K,DK) from TDK to i. So i ∈ σK(S). 
By repeated application of the propositions above it follows that the algorithm of
Section 3 computes the nucleolus of (N, r).
Proposition 4.4 For a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission structure (N, v,D),
the algorithm described in Section 4 finds the nucleolus of (N, r) within a finite number of
iterations.
Proof. In the first iteration the algorithm finds the nucleolus of the restricted game (U1, r1)
of (U1, v1,D1), which is equal to the subgame (U
1, rU1) of (N, r). By Proposition 4.2 and
the Davis-Maschler reduced game property it follows thatNuci(U
1, r1) = Nuci(N, r) for all
i ∈ U1. If U1 = N , the algorithm ends with the nucleolus in one iteration. Otherwise, the
algorithm continues in iteration 2 with the restricted game (N \U1, r2) of (N \ U1, v,D2).
By Proposition 4.3 this restricted game is equal to the DM reduced game on N \ U1 with
respect to the nucleolus and so the nucleolus payoffs of the game (N \ U1, r2) are equal to
the nucleolus payoffs of the players in N \U1 in the game (N, r). Repeating the arguments
of the first iteration, in the second iteration the algorithm computes the nucleolus payoffs
of the game (N \ U1, r2) for the players i ∈ U t2 , which thus is equal to their nucleolus
payoffs in the game (N, r). Subsequentially in each iteration k the algorithm computes
the nucleolus payoffs of the set of players in U tk . Since the number of players is reduced
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with at least one in each iteration of the algorithm, the algorithm ends within at most n
iterations. 
5 Properties of the algorithm
In this section we first show several properties of the algorithm. From these properties we
then obtain an interesting property of the nucleolus of a non-negative additive game with
permission structure, namely that each coalition consisting of a free player and its complete
subordinates distributes its own value among themselves. A free player is a player that
does not have a complete superior.
Definition 5.1 A player i ∈ N in an acyclic permission structure (N,D) is a free player
if and only if PD(i) = ∅.
Example 5.2 Consider permission structure (N,D) with N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and D =
{(1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 4), (3, 5), (3, 6), (4, 6)}. This permission structure has four free players.
Two of them are the two top players 1 and 2. Besides the top players the two other free
players are 4 and 6.
In the sequel we denote the set of free players in (N,D) by FD. Notice that TD ⊆ FD.
Recall from Subsection 2.2 that for every non-top player i, the set Pi denotes the collection
of all paths from TD to i. For a path p = (i1, . . . , im−1, im) ∈ Pi (so i1 ∈ TD and im = i),
in the sequel Hi(p) denotes the set of players H(p) \ {i}, i.e., Hi(p) is the set of all players
on the path p except player i itself. We now give two lemmas. The first one is obvious and
stated without proof.
Lemma 5.3 For every acyclic permission structure (N,D), if j is a (complete) superior
of i and k is a (complete) superior of j then k is a (complete) superior of i.
The second lemma states that for any free player i ∈ FD \ TD there exist (at least)
two paths p and q in Pi such that Hi(p) ∩ Hi(q) = ∅, i.e., for any non-top free player i
there exist two disjunct paths (except for i itself) from TD to i. Recall that it is assumed
that the players are enumerated (labeled) by the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n in such a way that
for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that i < j if (i, j) ∈ D.
Lemma 5.4 Let (N,D) be an acyclic permission structure and let i be a player in FD\TD.
Then there exist (at least) two paths p and q in Pi, such that Hi(p) ∩Hi(q) = ∅.
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Proof. For any two different paths ph and pk in Pi, define mhk = max{j|j ∈ Hi(p
k) ∩
Hi(p
h)} with the convention that mhk = 0 if Hi(pk) ∩Hi(ph) = ∅, i.e., mhk is the highest
labeled player that is on both paths. Further, define m = minh,k mhk. Suppose m ≥ 1,
i.e., there exist two paths, say p1 and p2 with Hi(p
1) ∩Hi(p2) = ∅, such that (i) m is the
highest labeled common node of p1 and p2 and (ii) mhk ≥ m for any two paths ph and pk
in Pi. Since i is a free player, and thus PD(i) = ∅, there is no player j = i that is on all
paths in Pi. Therefore we must have a third path, say p3 ∈ Pi, such that m ∈ Hi(p3).
Because of (ii) we have that m13 > m and m23 > m, so for both paths p
1 and p2 it holds
that they have a node in common with p3 with a higher label than m. For j = 1, 2, define
mj = min{s > m|s ∈ Hi(pj) ∩ Hi(p3)}, so mj is the lowest labeled common node on the
paths pj and p3 higher than m. Thus m1 > m and m2 > m and also m1 = m2, otherwise
m1 = m2 ∈ Hi(p1) ∩ Hi(p2), contradicting (i). Without loss of generality, suppose that
m1 > m2. Now, let p
4 be the path in Pi that is equal to p3 from TD to node m2 and it is
equal to p2 from m2 to i. Then m14 < m, because p
4 coincides with p2 from node m2 to i
and the highest labeled common node of p1 and p2 is node m < m2, and p
4 coincides with
p3 from TD to m2 and the smallest labeled common node of p
1 and p3 higher or equal to
m is node m1 > m2. However, m14 < m contradicts (ii). So it follows that m = 0, which
proves that there exists two paths in Pi that only have node i in common. 
Recall that in the first iteration player 1 is chosen to be the top and that the
nucleolus payoffs of the players in U1 are computed. In the second iteration the algorithm
continues with the non-negative additive game with permission structure (K, vK, D
K),
where K = N \U1, (K, vK) the subgame of (N, v) on K, and DK the permission structure
as obtained in formula (3.2). The next lemma states that j = 1 is a free player in (K,DK)
if and only if it is a free player in (N,D).
Lemma 5.5 Let (N,D) be an acyclic permission structure, K = N \ U1 and DK the
permission structure as defined in formula (3.2). Then FDK = FD \ {1}.
Proof. First, observe that U1 consists of player 1 and all its complete subordinates, so by
Lemma 3.1, U1 does not contain any of the players in FD \ {1}, and thus FD \ {1} ⊆ K.
We first prove that FD \ {1} ⊆ FDK . When i ∈ TD \ {1}, then obviously i ∈ TDK . So,
consider i ∈ FD \ TD. According to Lemma 5.4, there are two different paths in (N,D)
from TD to i. Let p be such a path. We consider two cases.
1. The path p is completely in K and PD(j) ∩ U1 = ∅ for any j ∈ H(p). Then any
link (h, k) ∈ D on the path is also a link in DK and p′ = p is a path in (K,DK) from
TD \ {1} ⊆ TDK to i.
2. There is some h ∈ H(p) such that PD(h) ∩ U
1 = ∅. With A(p) the set of all
players in H(p) having a predecessor in U1, let k be the player in A(p) such that k ≥ h for
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all h ∈ A(p), i.e., k is the player in A(p) with the highest label. Then, by formula (3.2),
any link (i, k) ∈ D(K) is deleted to obtain DK , so k ∈ TDK . Let p
′ be the path consisting
of the part of path p from k to i. Then p′ is a path from TDK to i in (K,D(K)). Observe
that p′ = (i) with i ∈ TDK if k = i.
It follows that every path p from TD to i in (N,D) gives a path p
′ from TDK to i in
(K,D(K)). When for some p the path p′ reduces to the single player path p′ = (i) (when
k = i in case 2), then i becomes a top player in (K,D(K)) and every path from TD to i
reduces to the single element i. Otherwise, i has two different paths in (K,DK)) when i
has two different paths in (N,D), because H(p′) ⊆ H(p) for every path p from TD to i. So
i ∈ FDK when i ∈ FD \ {1}.
Second, we prove the reverse inclusion that FDK ⊆ FD \{1}. To do so we show that
a node i = 1 which is not free in (N,D) is also not free in (K,DK). Let i ∈ FD \ {1},
so i has a complete superior in (N,D). When there is a complete superior in U1 then, by
Lemma 5.3, also 1 is a complete superior of i. Then i ∈ U1 and thus i is not in K. It
remains to consider the case that PD(i) ⊂ K. Let k be a player in PD(i). For p a path
from TD to i, let p
′ be the part of the path from k to i. Then there is no player h > k on
the path p′ that has a predecessor in U1, otherwise there is in (N,D) a path from 1 to the
predecessor of h in U1, then to h and then to i, contradicting that k is a complete superior
of i in the graph (N,D). So, when (j, l) ∈ D is a link on p′, then also (j, l) ∈ DK and thus
p′ is a path in (K,DK). Since this holds for every path p from TD to i in (N,D), it follows
that k is also a complete superior of i in (K,DK), and thus i is not free in (K,DK). 
The next lemma states that a player is chosen as top in one of the iterations of the
algorithm if and only if it is a free player in (N,D). Let AD denote the set of players that
is chosen as top in one of the iterations of the algorithm of Section 3.
Lemma 5.6 Let (N, v,D) be a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission struc-
ture. Then AD = FD.
Proof. The proof follows by repeated application of Lemma 5.5. In iteration 1, player
1 is chosen as top. So, player 1 belongs both to AD and FD. In iteration 2, player t2 is
chosen as top. This player is determined in Step 5 of the previous iteration as the top
player with the lowest label in (N2, D2) with N2 = N1 \ U1 = N \ U1 and D2 = DN2 . By
Lemma 5.5 this top belongs to FD2 = FD \{1}. From repeated application of the lemma it
follows that the top tk in iteration k is a top of FDk = FDk−1 \ {tk−1} = FD \ {t1, . . . , tk−1},
where (Nk, Dk) is the graph at iteration k. It follows that succeedingly all players of FD
are chosen as top in increasing order of their label. 
Finally we show that the set of complete subordinates of the chosen top tk in the
graph (Nk,Dk) in iteration k is equal to the set of complete subordinates of the free player
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tk in (N,D). Moreover we have that (U
tk ,Dk(U
tk)) = (U tk ,D(U tk)), i.e., the subgraph on
U tk of (Nk,Dk) is equal to the subgraph of U
tk of (N,D).
Lemma 5.7 Let (N, v,D) be a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission struc-
ture and let tk be the chosen top in iteration k of the algorithm. Then SDk(tk) = SD(tk).
Moreover, (U tk ,Dk(U
tk)) = (U tk , D(U tk)).
Proof. From the proof of Lemma 5.5 it follows that when k ∈ N2 = N1 \ U1 is a
complete superior of i in (N1,D1) = (N,D), then k is also a complete superior of i in
(N2, D2). With Lemma 3.1 it follows reversely that i ∈ SD2(k) when i ∈ SD1(k). On
the other hand, when i is not a complete subordinate of k in (N1,D1), then it also not
in (N2, D2) because D2 ⊂ D1 and either PD2(i) = ∅ or there is a path from TD2 to i
in (N2, D2) without k. So, for any k ∈ N2 we have that SD2(k) = SD1(k). The first
statement of the lemma follows by repeating these arguments for all the remaining top
players at any iteration of the algorithm. To show the second statement, let k ∈ N2 be
a complete superior of a player i ∈ N2. From the last part of the proof of Lemma 5.5
it follows that any link on a path from k to i in (N1, D1) is also a link in (N2, D2). So,
(U t2 , D2(U
t2)) = (U t2, D1(U
t2)) = (U t2 , D(U t2)). The result follows from repeating this at
any next iteration of the algorithm. 
We now come to the main result of this section. In Section 4 we have seen that the
algorithm of Section 3 at any iteration k computes the nucleolus payoffs in the restricted
game (N, r) of the players in U tk , where U tk is the set of players consisting of the chosen top
tk in iteration k and all its complete subordinates in (Nk, Dk). Moreover, the total payoff
of the players in U tk is equal to the sum of their values ai, i ∈ U tk . Therefore the next
proposition follows from the lemmas above without further proof. It states that for any
free player the nucleolus distributes the total contributions of this player and its complete
subordinates among themselves.
Proposition 5.8 Let (N, v,D) be a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission
structure. Then
∑
i∈SD(k)
Nuci(N, r) =
∑
i∈SD(k)
ai for every k ∈ FD.
Finally, when the structure of the graph (N,D) is known ex ante, in particular
the set FD is known ex ante and also for each k ∈ FD its set of complete subordinates,
it follows without further proof from the lemmas above that the algorithm of Section 3
reduces to |FD| applications of the algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008). To state this
result, for k ∈ FD, let rk be the restricted game of (SD(k), vk, D(SD(k)), where vk is the
non-negative additive game on SD(k) given by vk(S) =
∑
i∈S ai, S ⊆ SD(k). Then we
have the following proposition.
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Proposition 5.9 Let (N, v,D) be a non-negative additive game with acyclic permission
structure. Then Nuci(N, r) = Nuci(SD(k), rk), i ∈ SD(k), k ∈ FD.
From this last proposition we can conclude that for any k ∈ FD, the nucleolus values
in the game (N, r) of the players in SD(k) can be computed by applying the algorithm of
van den Brink et al. (2008) to (SD(k), vk,D(SD(k)).
6 Complexity of the algorithm
When the structure of the game is known ex ante we can apply Proposition 5.9 and apply
the algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) to any (SD(k), vk, D(SD(k)), k ∈ FD. Since
the complexity of this algorithm is of O(n4), the complexity reduces to O(|FD|a4), where
a = maxk∈FD |SD(k)|, because we have |FD| problems and the kth problem has complexity
O(|SD(k)|4). In particular, we have that the complexity is of O(n4) when |FD| = 1 (and
thus |SD(1)| = n) and of O(n) when |FD| = n (and thus |SD(k)| = 1 for all k). Clearly, in
the latter (extreme) case we have that (N,D) is the empty graph and (N, v,D) reduces to
the additive game, so that every player i gets its own value ai.
Typically in practice the structure is not known in advance. Also, although we
assumed in the previous sections that the players are enumerated by the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n
in such a way that for any i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n} it holds that i < j if (i, j) ∈ D, in practice
such an enumeration will not be known in advance. So, to perform the algorithm at each
iteration k first a top node tk in (Nk,Dk) has to be found and its corresponding set U
tk of
complete subordinates in (Nk, Dk). For the complexity of this search, let us consider the
first iteration. It is evident that we can find the collection TD of top nodes in at most n
2
actions, because we just have to consider each pair of players once. Then we enumerate
the top nodes from 1 to k1, where k1 = |TD| is the number of top nodes in (N,D). To find
the set U1 of all complete subordinates of top node 1 we can proceed as follows. First,
assign label 1 to every successor of node 1. Next, assign label 1 to every successor of every
node with label 1 and continu to do this. So, every player in the set ŜD(1) of subordinates
of top player 1 gets a label 1. Clearly, this requires at most O(n2) actions. Next, repeat
this procedure for every other top node, so for every player in the set ŜD(j) of top node
j, j = 1, . . . , k1. So, a node can receive multiple labels. The set U
1 consists of all nodes
that only receive label 1 and can be found in at most k1O(n2) < O(n3) actions. In fact
this procedure gives in at most O(n3) actions all top nodes j ∈ TD and their sets U j of
complete subordinates.
We can now use the result of Proposition 5.9 to modify the algorithm, namely
instead of adapting the graph after the first iteration according to Step 5, we first apply
k1 times the algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008), namely to subgame with permission
20
structure (Uk, vk,D(U
k)) for every top player k ∈ TD. The complexity of each application
is given by O(|Uk|4).
After having eliminated all top players and their complete subordinates we now
adapt the graph on the remaining set of players N \ (∪k∈TD U
k) analogously as described
in Step 5 of the algorithm. Let M be this set, then for each player j ∈ M we consider
whether or not j has a predecessor in (N,D) belonging to ∪k∈TD U
k. If so, all edges (h, j)
in the subgraph (M,D(M)) are deleted and j becomes a top node in the remaining graph.
Observe that such a top node in the new graph is a free player in (N,D). This requires
at most O(n2) actions and yields also the set of top nodes in the remaining graph. Next,
repeating the procedure as described above for the set of new top nodes, in O(m3) actions,
where m = |M |, the sets U j of complete subordinates of the new top nodes can be found.
Then we apply again the algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) to each new top node j
and its set of complete subordinates U j. After that we apply the procedure of finding the
new graph and new set of top players for the remaining nodes and so on.
Summarizing, starting the algorithm the number of actions to find the set of top
nodes and their sets of complete subordinates is of O(n3). This has to be repeated at most
n−1 times to find the set of all free players (each free player is a top node at some stage) and
their sets of complete subordinates. So, the number of actions to find all free players and
their sets of complete subordinates is (at most) of O(n4). For each free player k ∈ FD the
complexity of the algorithm of van den Brink et al. is of O(|Uk|4). Since
∑s
k=1 |U
k| = n,
where s = |FD|, the total complexity of applying the algorithm s times, namely for each
free player, is of O(n4). So, both the complexity of finding all free players and their sets of
complete subordinates and the total complexity to find the nucleolus payoffs for every free
player with its set of complete subordinates, is given by O(n4). Hence the total complexity
of the algorithm of Section 3 to find all nucleolus payoffs is of O(n4), showing that the
algorithm finds the nucleolus in polynomial time.
7 An example
In this section we illustrate the computation of the nucleolus for non-negative additive
disjunctive games with a permission structure by giving an example concerning a market
situation where sellers can sell objects to buyers through a (directed) network of interme-
diaries. First, we give a simple example without intermediaries7.
Example 7.1 Consider a situation where there is one seller (player 1) and one buyer
(player 2) who can realize a non-negative surplus a > 0 from trade. The corresponding
7This is a special case of the assignment game, introduced by Shapley and Shubik (1972).
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assignment game on N = {1, 2} is given by v({1}) = v({2}) = 0 and v({1, 2}) = a. Note
that the restricted game (N, r) on the permission structure D = {(1, 2)} (or D = {(2, 1)})
is the same as (N, v). Clearly, the nucleolus of this game yields an equal division of the
surplus, i.e., Nuc(N, v) = Nuc(N, r) = (a
2
, a
2
). But as soon as there are two or more sellers
(say players 1, . . . , n − 1}, such that the buyer (player n) can realize the surplus a with
any one of the sellers and cannot generate more surplus by trading with more sellers (for
example, the sellers all own one item of a good for which they have reservation value zero,
and the buyer wants only one item of the good and is prepared to pay at most a for it) then
the characteristic function of the assignment game on N = {1, . . . n} is v(S) = a if n ∈ S
and |S| ≥ 2, and v(S) = 0 otherwise. Again the restricted game on the permission structure
D = {(i, n) | i ∈ {1, . . . n−1} (i.e., the permission structure where all sellers are predecessor
of the buyer) is the same as (N, v). Now, it is clear that Nucn(N, v) = Nucn(N, r) = a
and Nuci(N, v) = Nuci(N, r) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . n − 1} since this is the unique Core
payoff vector. This also follows immediately from Proposition 5.8 by observing that r is
the restricted game of the non-negative additive game with ai = 0 for i = 1, . . . , n1 and
an = a and that player n is a free player in (N,D) and thus receives its own value. So,
similar as in a linear Bertrand price competition game, as soon as there is more than one
seller, the surplus fully goes to the buyer. (A similar story holds if there is only one seller
but more buyers.) 
Next, we consider an example of a market situation as described above, but buyers
and sellers may not be able to trade directly with each other, but need intermediaries to
connect them.
Example 7.2 Consider a market situation with two sellers (players 1 and 2) and four
buyers (players 7, 8, 9 and 10) who cannot trade directly with each other but need in-
termediaries. Consider the permission structure D on N = {1, . . . , 10} given by D =
{(1, 3), (1, 4), (2, 4), (2, 5), (2, 6), (3, 7), (4, 7), (4, 8), (5, 9), (6, 9), (6, 10)}, see Figure 1. For
every buyer-seller pair that wants to make a deal, it is sufficient to use only one of the
intermediaries they are both connected with. For example, for seller 1 and buyer 7 it is
necessary and sufficient to use either intermediary 3 or intermediary 4, while seller 1 and
buyer 8 need intermediary 4 to trade. Suppose that each seller owns at least four items of
the good and each buyer wants one item. Buyer i ∈ {7, 8, 9, 10} is prepared to pay ai > 0
for the item. The reservation value of the sellers and all intermediaries is zero. This can
be modelled as the game with permission structure (N, v,D) with N = {1, . . . , 10}, D as
given above, and v the non-negative additive game with ai = 0 for i = 1, . . . , 6 and ai > 0
for i = 7, . . . , 10, so that v(S) =
∑
i∈S ai =
∑
i∈S∩{7,8,9,10} ai for all S ⊆ N .
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Figure 1.
The nucleolus of the restricted game (N, r) can be computed using the algorithm of
Section 3 and the properties of Section 5. Notice that the players 1 and 2 are top players,
and that the set of free players is given by FD = {1, 2, 4, 7}. Using Proposition 5.9 it follows
that we can find the nucleolus of (N, r) by considering the four subgames with permission
structure given in Figure 2, namely one subgame for each of the four free players.
Figure 2
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The nucleoli for the four subgames are as follows.
1. Consider the game with permission structure (N1, v1,D1) given by N1 = {1, 3}, v1 =
v|N1 and D1 = D|N1 = {(1, 3)}. Since v1 is the null game assigning worth zero to all
coalitions in N1, it follows that Nuc1(N1, r1) = Nuc3(N1, r1) = 0.
2. For the game with permission structure (N2, v2,D2) given by N2 = {2, 5, 6, 9, 10}, v2 =
v|N2 , and D2 = D|N2 = {(2, 5), (2, 6), (5, 9), (6, 9), (6, 10)}, we have that v2(S) =∑
i∈S∩{9,10} ai for all S ⊆ N . Then the restricted game is given by
r2(S) =

a9 if S ∈ {{2, 5, 9}, {2, 6, 9}, {2, 5, 6, 9}}
a10 if S ∈ {{2, 6, 10}, {2, 5, 6, 10}}
a9 + a10 if S ∈ {{2, 6, 9, 10}, {2, 5, 6, 9, 10}}
0 otherwise.
Applying the algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008) (see the Appendix) we find
for any pair of values a9, a10 ≥ 0 that Nuc2(N2, r2) =
a9
2
+ a10
3
, Nuc5(N2, r2) =
0, Nuc6(N2, r2) =
a10
3
, Nuc9(N2, r2) =
a9
2
and Nuc10(N2, r2) =
a10
3
.
3. For the game with permission structure (N3, v3, D3) given by N3 = {4, 8}, v3 = v|N3
and D3 = D|N3 = {(4, 8)}, we have that v3(S) =
∑
i∈S∩{8} ai for all S ⊆ N . So, the
restricted game is given by
r3(S) =
{
a8 if S = {4, 8}
0 otherwise.
We find that Nuc4(N3, r3) = Nuc8(N3, r3) =
a8
2
.
4. The game with permission structure (N4, v4, D4) is given by N4 = {7}, v4 = v|N4 and
D4 = ∅. Clearly v4(S) = r4(S) = a7 for S = {7}, and thus Nuc7(N4, r4) = a7.
By Proposition 5.9 we then have Nuc(N, r) = (0, a9
2
+ a10
3
, 0, a8
2
, 0, a10
3
, a7,
a8
2
, a9
2
, a10
3
). 
In the example above, there was only one level of intermediaries, but the algorithm
also works if there are more levels of intermediaries between buyers and sellers.
Appendix: A polynomial time algorithm to compute
the nucleolus of a non-negative additive game with an
acyclic, quasi-strongly connected permission structure
In this appendix we recall the polynomial time algorithm of van den Brink et al. (2008).
Although they use this algorithm to compute the nucleolus for a more general class of games
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(those that satisfy the so-called weak digraph monotonicity and weak digraph convexity
conditions) we only apply it to non-negative additive games with an acyclic, quasi-strongly
connected permission structure in step 3 of the algorithm to compute the nucleolus for non-
negative additive games with a (more general) acyclic permission structure. This algorithm
computes the nucleolus in O(n4) time. It is an adaptation of the algorithm of Arin and
Feltkamp (1997) which computes the nucleolus of veto-rich games in exponential time. In
the following, ΩD = ΦD \ {N} denotes the collection of all feasible coalitions not equal to
N .
Consider a given non-negative additive game with an acyclic, quasi-strongly con-
nected permission structure (N, v,D).
Algorithm
Step 1 Set k = 0, U0 = N , v0 = v, D0 = D and r0 = r. Goto Step 2.
Step 2 Find Uk+1 ⊂ Uk satisfying
τ(Uk+1, rk) = τ
∗(rk) and |Uk+1| = max
{U∈ΩDk |τ(U,rk)=τ∗(rk)}
|U |,
where τ ∗(rk) = minU∈ΩDk τ (U, rk) with τ(U, rk) =
rk(Uk)−rk(U)
|Uk\U |+1
. Assign yj = τ
∗(rk) to
every player j ∈ Uk \ Uk+1. Goto Step 3.
Step 3 If Uk+1 = {1} then Goto Step 4. If Uk+1 = {1}, let ik+1 be the unique top-player of
the subgraph (Uk\Uk+1, Dk(Uk \Uk+1) of the digraph (Uk, Dk) restricted to Uk\Uk+1.
Define game (Uk+1, vk+1) by setting for every U ⊆ Uk+1,
vk+1(U) =
{
vk(U) if PDk(ik+1) ∩ U = ∅
vk(U ∪ (Uk \ Uk+1))− τ (Uk+1, rk)|Uk \ Uk+1| else,
(7.9)
digraph (Uk+1, Dk+1) given by
(i, j) ∈ Dk+1 if
{
(i, j) ∈ Dk or
Uk+1.
(7.10)
and let rk+1 be the restricted game of (Uk+1, vk+1, Dk+1). Set k = k + 1. Goto Step
2.
Step 4 Assign y1 = v(N)−
∑
j∈N\{1} xj. Stop.
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